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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920522-CA
Priority No. 2

ABEL TORRES,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim.
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony,

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in Addendum A:
Utah Const, art. I, § 14
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-22
Utah R. Crim. P. 12
Utah R. Crim. P. 15
U.S. Const. amend.IV
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES* AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the police officers exceed the permissible scope of

the stop by searching a car without a warrant and without proving
that a driver, who predominantly spoke Spanish, had knowingly and
intelligently understood and waived his "Miranda" rights,2 read to
him by an officer with a limited grasp of the foreign language?
"[T]he state must demonstrate that the consent was voluntary."

State

v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d
431, 437 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).

"In considering the

trial court's action in denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will not disturb its factual evaluation unless its findings are
clearly erroneous.

However, in assessing the trial court's legal

conclusions based on its factual findings, we afford it no deference
but apply a 'correction of error standard.'"

State v. Palmer. 802

P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990).
2.

Did the court err in not suppressing the illegal

"fruits" of the improper police conduct?

"A trial court's legal

conclusions are accorded no particular deference."

Grayson Roper

Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).

1 The issues were raised pursuant to "the Utah Constitution
as opposed to the Federal Constitution[.]" (R 91). Utah Const,
art. I, § 14. Any references to federal law or other state court
opinions are for guiding this Court in its independent
determination, and not as authoritative weight. See Michigan v.
Long. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 58-37-8(2)(a) (Supp. 1992).
On June 5, 1992, Defendant/Appellant Abel Torres moved "to suppress
evidence illegally seized" by the arresting officers on February 1,
1992.

(R 49-50).

Following the suppression hearing, held on

June 10, 1992, the court entered preliminary findings of fact.
(R 163-70); see infra Point I.

The parties also submitted written

memoranda for the court's consideration.

(R 51-71).

By stipulation, the parties agreed that in the event the
court denied the motion the evidence heard during the motion to
suppress proceeding could be viewed as evidence for a bench
"trial."

(R 52).

The court denied Mr. Torres' motion.

(R 71).

On July 31, 1992, the court sentenced Mr. Torres to an
indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.

Mr. Torres was placed on informal probation to the court

and held in jail pending his release to the I.N.S.

(R 73). 3 Other

relevant statements are stated elsewhere in the brief.

See infra

"Statement of Facts"; Point I.

3
Although the record is unclear, Mr. Torres may have
been deported. His appeal, however, is not mooted. "Far from
mooting his appeal, [a defendant's] deportation makes the appeal all
the more significant. As a result of his Yakima conviction
[possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), the defendant] will
be unable to return to this country." State v. Ortiz, 774 P.2d 1229
(Wash. 1989) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23): alien convicted of
narcotics offense "shall be excluded from admission into the United
States")).
- 3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The factual findings initially stated by the trial court
are reflected by the following exchange:
THE COURT: . . . I am willing to make some
findings on the record, if you would like.
[Counsel for Mr. Torres]:

That would help.

THE COURT: I suppose Officer [Cory] Lyman stated
it as well as I could, and that is that the facts
substantially are as indicated, that there was a
contact between officer Ekker and a confidential
informant [in Southern Utah]. That that confidential
informant contacted two individuals [Larry and Gina
Thatcher] who agreed to purchase for him a quantity of
cocaine for nine hundred dollars, I think the amount
was. And that based upon that contact that
Officer Ekker followed him as he indicated in his
testimony and listened to a conversation between them
[the wired confidential informant and the Thatchers]
that would lead him to reasonably believe that a sale
of cocaine was going to go down in Salt Lake City.
That he followed them in that vehicle to Salt Lake
City and he in turn made contact with the
Metropolitan—
[Counsel for the State]:

Metro-Narcotics.

THE COURT: Metro-Narcotics people and asked for
assistance. That there were Utah County officers who
joined that procession into Salt Lake, as well. As I
counted, there were seven cars and I will find that
there were seven cars and seven police officers at
least followed the confidential informant and the two
suspects [Thatchers] to Salt Lake to a location on the
west side of Salt Lake on Fourth South and about
Seventh West; listened again to the conversation
indicating that the person whom he was going to make
contact, supply the narcotics was not then available,
took them back to McDonald's Drive-in or Store and
that he and the lady went in and remained while the
other suspect took the vehicle that they had driven
there and left. That Officer Lyman was in contact
with Mr. Ekker and others who were pursuing his
vehicle. And that he in turn engaged in a stop of
that vehicle based upon the information that he had

- 4

from Officer Ekker and from the observations that he
made.
Now, I will also find that at the time of the stop
the defendant [Mr. Abel Torres] was driving the
vehicle together with a female identified as his wife
and that Officer Lyman attempted to state the Miranda
warning in both English — I don't think he even tried
in English but in Spanish. I am not convinced that
the defendant understood what was going on and I am
not sure that he understood and perceived his rights
to counsel before making a statement. I do have some
doubt about his consent to search the car and his
home. I am almost willing to rule however that there
was a reasonable articulable suspicion that there were
narcotics and drugs, that he was part of the drug
transaction and that the search of the car was
reasonable under those circumstances. But if you want
to brief it, that's fine.
[Counsel for Mr. Torres]: I think two things with
regard to your findings, I would ask the court to
consider including in those verbal findings two
things, that once Detective Lyman began the
observation of the car, that the — he lost sight of
the car for a period of approximately fifteen minutes
and re-encountered the car by positioning himself in
what he thought to be a logical return route.
THE COURT:

I will make that a finding.

[Counsel for Mr. Torres]: The additional fact I
think that has been proved is that when the stop was
made that the individuals in the car did not match the
description of the people who were believed to have —
or supposed to be in the car.
THE COURT: I agree. I will make that finding. I
think the issue is whether or not it is reasonable and
there is a reasonable inference that the defendant was
a part of this entire transaction because of the
events and circumstances that had occurred before the
stop.
[Counsel for Mr. Torres]: I am assuming from what
the court said you are prepared to rule today that
there was reasonable articulable suspicion to stop. I
have heard the court indicate some concern over the
subsequent waiver and consent. Is that an issue that
you are still —

- 5
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THE COURT: I don't think you need address that.
I think I am willing to—am ready to concede there was
probably no proper waiver and consent for the search
of the house at least. But I am not sure that you
need a waiver and consent to search the car and the
circumstances of that search. Are you arguing that
they — that the consent was necessary to search the
car?
[Counsel for Mr. Torres]:

Yes.

THE COURT: [Counsel for the State], do you
believe that to be the fact?
[Counsel for the State]: No. I am concerned a
little about the consent. I have seen enough people
who speak foreign languages come to court and play
games as far as their knowledge.
THE COURT:

I agree that can be done very easily.

[Counsel for the State]: It is my opinion that
that's being done today, based on the officer's
testimony.
THE COURT: Let me reserve a ruling on that
issue. If you want to —
[Counsel for the State]: I don't know how I am
going to prove that. I can't obviously believe that—
THE COURT: You put on everything you have got.
Let me indicate that I will probably want to
reconsider and think about that issue.
[Counsel for the State]: I think the officer
testified that there was some conversations both in
English and Spanish, I think it is also clear that
under our United States Supreme Court case law that
Miranda warnings and the individual words inside the
Miranda don't need to be explained and defined other
than do you understand each of the rights explained to
you. If the answer is yes, the officer is allowed to
proceed.
THE COURT: Let me say I am a little more
concerned about the issue of the waiver and consent
than I am of the issue of reasonable suspicion.
[Counsel for Mr. Torres]: I would ask the court
to find that the officer admitted to deceiving the
- 6
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defendant prior to the first consent to search.
THE COURT: I will find that he expressed some
facts that were not factually true.
[Counsel for the State]: The deception is though
we have been watching you, we know you are dealing
drugs and the defendant goes, you got me. I guess
that's an exception, but it is not the kind of thing
that would be unexpected of a narcotics dealer. If
they don't lie or say we have got a warrant or, you
know, he said, "We have been watching you. We know
you have got drugs." He said, "Yeah, you are right."
I don't see that that is necessarily a deception. I
am concerned about the defendant's standing to say you
can't search the seat of this car. It is not even his
car. Officers only see him driving it and with some
suspicion that this car is being used to go pick up
some cocaine. That's the reasonable suspicion that
suspicion is exactly confirmed. The only difference
is —
THE COURT: He is in possession of the car and
obviously with the consent of the owner.
[Counsel for the State]: That's not true —
owner is over there at McDonald's.

the

THE COURT: At least he is in possession of the
car with the consent of the person who has the right
to have — I assume the young lady who's registered
owner of the car is you know — what you want me to
believe is this—she said, "Take my car and go down
and get this stuff."
[Counsel for the State]: I can supply cases to
the court if you need to the effect that an onerable
situation, even Utah, the officer is allowed to search
the area in the immediate vicinity of the driver,
passenger of the car. That is for primarily the
driver's safety. The officer will testify that coke
was found under the seat.
THE COURT: If the officer has a reasonable
articulable suspicion under the cases I am familiar
with he has the right to do a search of the car,
doesn't he?
[Counsel for the State]:
THE COURT:

Right.

With or without consent.
- 7
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[Counsel for Mr. Torres]: That goes to the Terry
issue and whether the scope exceeds what he is
intending to do. Certainly, that goes to the house.
You can't forget that the officer said that he
believed that the so-called consent was in part based
upon the deception that the officer had made to him,
so if we should brief that issue, Your Honor, when
would you want us to do that?
THE COURT:

Ten days.

See (R 163-69) (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Proceedings, dated
June 10, 1992) (attached as Addendum B ) .
Each party then submitted written memoranda to the trial
court.

(R 52-70).

The court, however, simply denied the

suppression motion in a minute entry.

(R 71).

No findings or

conclusions on consent were rendered by the court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
While the existence of "reasonable suspicion" and "consent"
were both in dispute, the trial court's preliminary findings and its
summary ruling suggests that its disposition of the first issue
eliminated any need for it to rule on the second issue.

Even if

reasonable suspicion existed, however, the court still should have
reached the issue of consent.

Its failure to do so requires the

case to be vacated and remanded.
Alternatively, the State failed to meet its burden of
showing that Mr. Torres knowingly and intelligently consented to the
officer's search of the car.

Mr. Torres, an individual who

predominately spoke Spanish, did not understand the Miranda rights
inadequately communicated to him by the investigating officer.
"fruits" therefrom should have been suppressed.
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The

ARGUMENT
POINT I
REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
FAILURE TO ENTER ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991),

the Utah

Supreme Court vacated the defendant's conviction and remanded the
case for retrial on the following grounds:
in ruling on Ramirez's pretrial motion to suppress,
the trial judge failed to make adequate findings and
that absent the findings of fact and conclusions of
law required by rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, it is impossible for us to
determine the lawfulness of the stop and seizure.
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c).
817 P.2d at 776.

The holding in Ramirez governs the present appeal.

Id.; see also Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).4
In Ramirez, the defendant moved to suppress evidence based
on, inter alia, an unlawful identification procedure and an illegal
search and seizure:
[Prior to trial, Ramirez] moved to suppress all
evidence seized from him, on [the] grounds that the
seizure violated his rights under the federal and
state constitutions. The trial court denied the
motion to suppress the identification, but took under
advisement the motion to suppress based on unlawful

4
Another case consistent with the holding in Ramirez is
Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987). See id. at 999 (retrial
appropriate in light of the inadequate court findings and
conclusions, and because the trial judge had retired). The trial
judge here, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, has also retired.
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stop and seizure. The trial judge never explicitly
ruled on this pretrial motion.

As noted, the record before us does not include an
explicit ruling on the lawfulness of the stop and
seizure. The trial court's minute entry denying the
motion for a new trial reaffirms the court's earlier
ruling refusing to suppress the evidence. The earlier
ruling, however, does not state clearly whether the
refusal to suppress is based only on a determination
that the identification procedure was lawful or also
on an unrecorded ruling on the lawfulness of the stop
and seizure.
817 P.2d at 777-78.
As in Ramirez, the trial court here "took under advisement
the motion to suppress based on [consent]."

See (R 166-67) (after

the June 10, 1992 suppression hearing, the court stated, "Let me
reserve a ruling on that issue [consent] . . . I will probably want
to reconsider and think about that issue [consent]).

Following

these comments and other statements favorable to Mr. Torres on the
lack of lawfully obtained consent, see generally Point II, the
court's July 21, 1992 minute entry then stated nothing in a formal
manner on either the "reasonable suspicion" issue or the "lack of
consent" issue.

(R 71).

The minute entry just summarily denied the

motion to suppress.
The court's denial is inconsistent with its statements
pertaining to consent:
Officer Lyman attempted to state the Miranda warning
in both English — I [the court] don't think he even
tried in English but in Spanish. I am not convinced
that the defendant understood what was going on and I

- 10 -

am not sure that he understood and perceived his
rights to counsel before making a statement. I do
have some doubt about his consent to search the car
and his home.
(R 164-65); see also (R 167) ("Let me say I [the court] am a little
more concerned about the issue of the waiver and consent than I am
of the issue of reasonable suspicion").
Like the search and seizure issue in Ramirez. the issues in
the instant action, particularly the inadequacy of consent, cannot
be deemed to have been implicitly supported by the courts denial of
the suppression motion.
(Utah 1991).

See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787

The court's own expressed statements make such an

implicit ruling unreasonable.

A retrial is necessary.

Id. at 788

("If the ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption unreasonable,
however, we remand for a new trial"); see also id. at 787-88 n.6.
At best, the court informally expressed a lack of concern
with the "reasonable suspicion" issue.

(R 167); (R 165) ("I [the

court] am almost willing to rule however that there was a reasonable
articulable suspicion that there were narcotics and drugs, that he
was part of the drug transaction and that the search of the car was
reasonable under those circumstances"). Even assuming, arguendo,
that reasonable suspicion did exist, see infra note 6, reversal
still is required because the court did not conclude that Mr. Torres
consented to the search nor could it have held that consent was
knowingly and intelligently obtained.

See infra Point II; compare

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 786-89 (taking "under advisement" a suppression
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issue and failing to explicitly rule on it was reversible error even
though another issue [i.e. identification] was properly discounted),
with (R 166-67) ("Let me [the court] reserve a ruling on that issue
[consent] . . . I will probably want to reconsider and think about
that issue [consent]).
Although the trial court had intended to guide the parties
with its statements, its preliminary factual findings and legal
conclusions were inadequate for "meaningful review [of] the issues
on appeal."

817 P.2d at 788 (quoting State v. Lovecrren. 798 P.2d

767f 770 (Utah App. 1990)).

The minute entry denying Mr. Torres'

motion to suppress was not enough.

(R 71).

His conviction should

be vacated with an order remanding the case for a new trial.

See

Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 776, 789 ("To ask the trial court to address
the admissibility question now would be to tempt it to reach a post
hoc rationalization for the admission of this pivotal evidence");
Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).
POINT II
THE OFFICERS EXCEEDED THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF THE
INTERFERENCE
In the alternative and assuming the stop of the "charcoal
gray" Oldsmobile was not improper,5 the officers subsequent actions
exceeded the permissible scope of the investigative intrusion.

The

5
Appellant acknowledges that under the federal
constitution, U.S. Const, amend. IV, the officers possessed
"reasonable suspicion" for the stop. Appellant does not address
(nor concede) the initial stop pursuant to a state constitutional
analysis.
- 12 -

occupants of the stopped car, Abel Torres and his wife, were
admittedly "in no way similar" to the persons suspected of being
involved in the drug transaction.

(R 144, 165). The investigating

officers had no knowledge of a female passenger and the individual
driving the car, Mr. Torres, did not match the description of the
targeted suspect.

(R 143-44).

Sergeant Cory Lyman, an officer

involved in the investigation once the targeted Oldsmobile drove
into Salt Lake County, testified, "I was wrong about the
occupants."

(R 146, 165).

Lyman, who "didn't really participate in the surveillance"
and who "couldn't see" the Oldsmobile leave McDonald's, (R 127,
130), "monitor[ed] the [police] radio" to ascertain where the car
was going.

(R 13 0-31).

Other officers reported that the car went

to "960 West on 400 South[,]" the alley way where the car had been
before.

(R 131).

The driver, Larry Thatcher, then exited the car.

(R 131). Even though Lyman believed there were "five [police] cars
involved in this surveillance[,]" none of the officers reported
seeing anyone return to the car.

(R 131).

Two people, however,

were later seen in the Oldsmobile as it left the alley.

(R 131).

As the officers attempted to follow the car, they lost
track of it for approximately fifteen-to-twenty minutes.

(R 144).

The police "figured the suspect was watching their vehicle and
suspected that [the officers] were following them . . . "

(R 132).

The officers "pulled off in order to relieve the suspicion."
(R 132).

- 13 -

Thinking that the car would return to the alley, the
officers waited at a nearby location.

(R 132).

When the car

approached, a marked police car "pulled in behind them . . . [and
turned on] the emergency equipment.
immediately."

(R 134).

The driver pulled over

After the uniformed officers told the

driver and the passenger to get out of the car, "the driver was —
was a different person than I [Sergeant Lyman] had anticipated.

I

was expecting the male suspect [Larry Thatcher] to get out."
(R 135).

Lyman ordered the stop because the car was the same as the

identified vehicle.

(R 134).

The occupants, however, were different than expected.
driver was Abel Torres and the passenger was his wife.

The

(R 135).

Nevertheless, the officers confronted Mr. Torres and proceeded to
question him.

(R 135).

The issues now in dispute are whether the

State proved that Mr. Torres had validly waived his constitutional
rights and whether the two ensuing searches were illegal.
At the outset, the trial court did not hold that "probable
cause" existed.

Hence, even if the officers possessed "reasonable

suspicion," the officers7 search of the car would have exceeded the
scope of the "level two" investigative detention.

See Florida v.

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983) ("In the name of investigating a
person who is no more than suspected of criminal activity, the
police may not carry out a full search of the person or of his
automobile or other effects")); cf. State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460
(Utah 1990); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1990).
court's "ruling" to the contrary was in error.

- 14 -

See (R 165)

The

(emphasis added) ("I [the court] am almost willing to rule however
that there was a reasonable articulable suspicion that there were
narcotics and drugs, that he was part of the drug transaction and
that the search of the car was reasonable under those
circumstances").6

See also Point I.

The parties here do not dispute that the officers had no
warrant; they differ only on the unlawfulness of the procured
consent,

"Searches conducted 'outside the judicial process, without

prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions./H

State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684,

687 (Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967)).

"[W]here the validity of the search rests on consent, the

State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was
obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that
is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful
authority."

Royer, 460 U.S. at 497; accord Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687.

(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that
the consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely
and intelligently given"; (2) the government must
prove consent was given without duress or coercion,
express or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver of

6
As suggested by the following statement, the trial
court probably viewed "consent" as an nonissue because of its
"holding" that reasonable suspicion existed. (R 168) ("If the
officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion under the cases I
[the court] am familiar with he has the right to do a search of the
car [with or without consent], doesn't he?).
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fundamental constitutional rights and there must be
convincing evidence that such rights were waived.
United States v. Abbott. 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977), quoted
in State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467 (Utah App. 1991); accord State
v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d
1105 (Utah 1990).
at bar.

The State failed to meet its burden in the case

It simply did not establish that, one, the officer properly

communicated the "Miranda" rights to Mr. Abel Torres, and, two, that
Abel knowingly and intelligently waived those rights before he
"consented" to the officer's search of the car.
The actions (or inactions) of Sergeant Lyman reflected his
own uncertainty about his ability to communicate properly with
Mr. Torres.

Before Sergeant Lyman attempted to converse with Torres:

there [were] a few minutes [in] between, because I
[Sergeant Lyman] went and talked to Mike Blackhurst.
He is a sergeant with Utah County Task Force. I asked
if they had anyone—if the officers had contacted.
They indicated he [Mr. Torres] spoke only Spanish. I
asked if they had any officers that could converse
with him in Spanish. They didn't have anyone who
spoke any Spanish. I speak a little bit of Spanish.
So I talked to him [Torres] and assumed the role
thereof, being the one to talk to him.
(R 135-36).
The trial court was not swayed by Lyman's references to his
long since past "[j]unior high through high school" Spanish
classes.

(R 149).

Sergeant Lyman is 35 years old.

formal training in the foreign language.

(R 149).

He has had no
Lyman claimed to

be able to read, write, and "converse" in Spanish, yet he admitted
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that he did "not consider [him]self capable of doing what this
gentleman [the Spanish interpreter was] doing and translate."
(R 153).
The trial court determines if an interpreter is necessary,
see Utah R. Crim. P. 15; otherwise, all "[j]udicial proceedings
shall be conducted in the English language."

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-7-22. The presence of a Spanish interpreter during the lower
court proceedings reflected both the trial court's belief that an
interpreter was needed to properly apprise Torres of his rights and
the admitted shortcomings of Lyman's "assumption] [of] the role" of
interpreter.
1971).

Landereous v. State. 480 P.2d 273 (Okla. Crim. App.

As explained by the trial court:
Officer Lyman attempted to state the Miranda warning
in both English — I [the court] don't think he even
tried in English but in Spanish. I am not convinced
that the defendant understood what was going on and I
am not sure that he understood and perceived his
rights to counsel before making a statement. I do
have some doubt about his consent to search the car
and his home.

(R 164-65).

Sergeant Lyman failed to properly communicated the

"Miranda" rights to Mr. Torres.

See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 684 ("case

law holds that a consent which is not voluntarily given is invalid").
On a related note, even if the trial court had found that
Sergeant Lyman's limited grasp of Spanish sufficed for the reading
of Miranda rights—a finding the court was unwilling to make—the
sergeant's deceptive approach further invalidated the consent.

The

court found that the sergeant "expressed some facts that were not
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factually true."

(R 167). Lyman deceived Torres by telling him

that the officers had been watching him when they really had not.
(R 155). Sergeant Lyman's own testimony follows:
Q [Counsel for Mr. Torres:]
[Abel Torres]?
A

[Sergeant Lyman:]

You [Lyman] deceived him

Yes, I did.

Q And you deceived him prior to getting his consent
to search the car; isn't that right?
A Yes, to some extent, I let him think I knew more
than I knew. That was my intention.
Q You don't think his consent would have been
affected by your having lied to him?
A It was probably going to be affected by it. That's
why I mean — it is an interviewing technique, trying
to find out information.
Q

Lying is an interviewing technique?

A Sometimes I prefer to call it subterfuge or
something like that.
Q So his subsequent consent to have you search his
car then his house is based upon lies that you told
him which you admit might have affected his consent;
isn't that right?
A I admit it probably would have affected his
perception of what was happening.
(R 155).
Mr. Torres, who had not understood the rights read to him,
(R 160, 164), was then improperly deceived into waiving his rights.
He is a man with a second grade level of education who had never
encountered such problems before.

(R 159, 162); cf. Clewis v.

Texas. 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (factors of weight in an involuntary
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determination was the defendant's fifth grade education and the fact
that he "had apparently never been in trouble with the law before");
see State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1990) (citation
omitted) ("In examining all the surrounding circumstances to
determine if in fact the consent to search was coerced, a court must
take into account both the details of police conduct and the
characteristics of the accused, which include 'subtly coercive
police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective
state of the person who consents'").
Sergeant Lyman also failed to inform Torres that he had a
right to refuse the officers' search into his car or house.

(R 160).

Although "the government need not establish such knowledge as the
sine qua non of an effective consent[,] Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.
412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973), quoted in State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431,
437 (Utah App. 1990), this Court has noted that such a factor may be
reflective of invalidly obtained consent:

when defendant [Robinson]

was "asked [by officers] to consent to a search of the vehicle[,]
[t]here [was] no evidence that Robinson was aware or was informed
that he did not have to accede to the trooper's request."

Robinson.

797 P.2d at 438; see also State v. Hewitt. 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 n.l
(Utah App. 1992) (in Appellant Hewitt's briefs, incorporated herein
by reference, Hewitt argued that the state constitution requires
consent for a search to be knowing as well as voluntary).
Mr. Torres' consent was neither voluntarily, nor knowingly.
improperly and deceptively procured.

It was

The federal principles of

Robinson apply here with at least equal, if not greater force to
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Appellant Torres' state constitutional argument.

Cf. State v.

Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (more protective state
constitutional interpretation of the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991);
State v. Thompson. 760 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Idaho 1988) (citation
omitted) ("Long gone are the days when state courts will blindly
apply United States Supreme Court interpretation and methodology
when in the process of interpreting their own constitutions").
Again, Appellant Torres notes that the above-stated
"findings" and "conclusions" on consent were ultimately taken under
advisement or "reserve[d]" for "reconsider[ation]."

(R 166-67).

The trial court's failure to finalize and formalize its ruling
constitutes grounds for reversal, see Point I, and in light of its
statements, the court's (minute entry) denial of the suppression
motion cannot implicitly support a favorable ruling on consent.
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 787-88 n.6.

Cf.

More likely, the court mistakenly

viewed the existence of reasonable suspicion as determinative of the
matter.

See supra note 6.
In any case, at the close of the suppression hearing (which

was the evidentiary equivalent of testimony to be presented at
trial, [R 52]), the State itself expressed doubt as to whether
consent was or could have been established:
THE COURT: . . . Are you [Counsel for Mr. Torres]
arguing that they — that the consent was necessary to
search the car?
[Counsel for Mr. Torres]; Yes
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THE COURT: [Counsel for the State], do you believe
that to be the fact?
[Counsel for the State]: No. I am concerned a little
about the consent. I have seen enough people who
speak foreign languages come to court and play games
as far as their knowledge.
THE COURT:

I agree that can be done very easily.

[Counsel for the State]: It is my opinion that that's
being done today, based on the officer's testimony.
THE COURT: Let me reserve a ruling on that issue.
you want to —

If

[Counsel for the State]: I don't know how I am going
to prove that. I can't obviously believe that —
THE COURT: You put on everything you have got. Let
me indicate that I will probably want to reconsider
and think about that issue.
(R 166-67) (emphasis added).

The State did not carry its burden of

proving that consent was knowingly and voluntarily obtained.
(R 164) ("I [the court] do have some doubt about his consent to
search the car and his home"); see State v. Sampson. 808 P.2d 1100,
1108 (Utah App. 1990) ("the state has a heavy burden to establish
both that a defendant understood his Miranda rights and that he
voluntarily waived them""), on petition for reh'g, (Utah App. 1991),
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied,

U.S.

,

112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d
460, 467 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d
883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977) ("the courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights
and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were
waived")); State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991) ("in
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considering the lawfulness of the stop and the seizure and the
search, the trial court should regard with caution any claim that
the suspect "consented.").
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING THE ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE
"[Information gained by law enforcement officers during an
illegal search cannot be used in a derivative manner to obtain other
evidence . . . "

United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236, 243-44 (7th

Cir.), cert, denied. 419 U.S. 1048 (1974), quoted in State v.
Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 691 (Utah 1990).

Mr. Torres7 "consent,"

improperly obtained, cannot be used to justify the officer's search
of the car.

Evidence from the car should have been suppressed.

(R 137). The search of the house, which occurred "consensually" and
immediately after the officer's seizure of the substances found in
the car, were also unlawfully obtained for reasons similar to those
already discussed.

See Point II; Wong Sun v. United States. 371

U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Sampson. 808 P.2d 1100, 1113 (Utah App.
1990) ("the trial court must exclude all primary evidence elicited
during the custodial interrogation and all incriminating evidence
derived therefrom which is not saved by an exception to the
exclusionary rule"), on petition for reh'g, (Utah App. 1991), cert.
denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied.

U.S.

, 112

S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992); State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460
(Utah App. 1991) (prior police illegality was not sufficiently
attenuated from the taint).
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CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and remand for a new
trial.
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ADDENDUM A

58-37-8- Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directlyfroma practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;

78-7-22. English language for proceedings.
Judicial proceedings shall be conducted in the English language.

Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized*
Article I, § 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec* 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance
of warrant*]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 12. Motions.
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion
other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the
court otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity the grounds upon
which it is made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported by
affidavit or by evidence.
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on the
admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial
of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to
charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any
time during the pendency of the proceeding;
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence;
(3) requests for discovery where allowed;
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants under Rule 9; or
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination.
Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall
state its findings on the record.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the
court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant
relief from such waiver.
(e) Except injustices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions
of law as are made orally.
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.

Rule 15. Expert witnesses and interpreters.
(a) The court may appoint any expert witness agreed upon by the parties or
of its own selection. An expert so appointed shall be informed of his duties by
the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed. An expert so appointed
shall advise the court and the parties of his findings and may thereafter be
called to testify by the court or by any party. He shall be subject to crossexamination by each party. The court shall determine the reasonable compensation of the expert and direct payment thereof. The parties may call expert
witnesses of their own at their own expense. Upon showing that a defendant is
financially unable to pay the fees of an expert whose services are necessary for
adequate defense, the witness fee shall be paid as if he were called on behalf of
the prosecution.
(b) The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and shall
determine reasonable compensation and direct payment thereof. The court
may allow counsel to question the interpreter before he is sworn to discharge
the duties of an interpreter.
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1

MR. SKORDAS:

2

MS. WELLS:

No, Your Honor.

Unless the court feels that it has

3

sufficient information about the case and the law that

4

governs it, and we are prepared to rule now, I am prepared

5

to ask that it be briefed.

6

THE COURT:

No problem.

7

That's fine.

8

record, if you would like.

Do you want to brief it?

I am willing to make some findings on the

9

MS. WELLS:

That would help.

10

THE COURT:

I suppose Officer Lyman stated it as

11

well as I could, and that is that the facts substantially

12

are as indicated, that there was a contact between officer

13

Ekker and a confidential informant.

14

informant contacted two individuals who agreed to purchase

15

for him a quantity of cocaine for nine hundred dollars, I

16

think the amount was. And that based upon that contact

17

that Officer Ekker followed him as he indicated in his

18

testimony and listened to a conversation between them that

19

would lead him to reasonably believe that a sale of cocaine

20

was going to go down in Salt Lake City.

21

them in that vehicle to Salt Lake City and he in turn made

22

contact with the Metropolitan—

23

MR. SKORDAS:

24

THE COURT:

25

assistance.

That that confidential

That he followed

Metro-Narcotics.

Metro-Narcotics people and asked for

That there were Utah County officers who
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1

joined that procession into Salt Lake, as well. As I

2

counted, there were seven cars and I will find that there

3 were seven cars and seven police officers at least followed
4

the confidential informant and the two suspects to Salt

5

Lake to a location on the west side of Salt Lake on Fourth

6

South and about Seventh West; listened again to the

7

conversation indicating that the person whom he was going

8

to make contact, supply the narcotics was not then

9

available, took them back to McDonald's Drive-in or Store

10

and that he and the lady went in and remained while the

11

other suspect took the vehicle that they had driven there

12

and left.

13

and others who were pursuing his vehicle. And that he in

14

turn engaged in a stop of that vehicle based upon the

15

information that he had from Officer Ekker and from the

16

observations that he made.

17

That Officer Lyman was in contact with Mr. Ekker

Now, I will also find that at the time of the

18

stop the defendant was driving the vehicle together with a

19

female identified as his wife and that Officer Lyman

20

attempted to state the Miranda warning in both English —

21

don't think he even tried in English but in Spanish.

22

not convinced that the defendant understood what was going

23

on and I am not sure that he understood and perceived his

24

rights to counsel before making a statement.

25

some doubt about his consent to search the car and his

I

I am

I do have
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77

home*

I am almost willing to rule however that there was a

reasonable articulable suspicion that there were narcotics
and drugs, that he was part of the drug transaction and
that the search of the car was reasonable under those
circumstances.

But if you want to brief it, that's fine.

MS. WELLS:

I think, two things with regard to

your findings, I would ask the court to consider including
in those verbal findings two things, that once Detective
Lyman began the observation of the car, that the —

he lost

sight of the car for a period of approximately fifteen
minutes and re-encountered the car by positioning himself
in what he thought to be a logical return route.
THE COURT:

I will make that a finding.

MS. WELLS:

The additional fact I think that has

been proved is that when the stop was made that the
individuals in the car did not match the description of the
people who were believed to have —

or supposed to be in

the car.
THE COURT:

I agree.

I will make that finding.

I think the issue is whether or not it is reasonable and
there is a reasonable inference that the defendant was a
part of this entire transaction because of the events and
circumstances that had occurred before the stop.
MS. WELLS:

I am assuming from what the^court

said you are prepared to rule today that there was
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1

reasonable articulable suspicion to stop.

I have heard the

2

court indicate some concern over the subsequent waiver and

3

consent.

Is that an issue that you are still —
THE COURT:

4

I don't think you need address that.

5

I think I am willing to—am ready to concede there was

6

probably no proper waiver and consent for the search of the

7

house at least.

8

and consent to search the car and the circumstances of that

9

search.

10

But I am not sure that you need a waiver

Are you arguing that they —

necessary to search the car?

11

MS. WELLS: Yes.

12

THE COURT:

13

that the consent was

Mr. Skordas, do you believe that to

be the fact?

14

MR. SKORDAS:

No.

I am concerned a little about

15

the consent.

16

languages come to court and play games as far as their

17

knowledge.

I have seen enough people who speak foreign

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. SKORDAS:

20

23
24
25

It is my opinion that that's being

done today, based on the officer's testimony.

21
22

I agree that can be done very easily.

THE COURT:
issue.

Let me reserve a ruling on that

If you want to —
MR. SKORDAS:

prove that.

I don't know how I am going to

I can't obviously believe that—

THE COURT:

You put on everything you have got.

0166

79

Let me indicate that I will probably want to reconsider and
think about that issue.
MR. SKORDAS:

I think the officer testified that

there was some conversations both in English and Spanish.
I think it is also clear that under our United States
Supreme Court case law that Miranda warnings and the
individual words inside the Miranda don't need to be
explained and defined other than do you understand each of
the rights explained to you.

If the answer is yes, the

officer is allowed to proceed.
THE COURT:

Let me say I am a little more

concerned about the issue of the waiver and consent than I
am of the issue of reasonable suspicion.
MS. WELLS:

I would ask the court to find that

the officer admitted to deceiving the defendant prior to
the first consent to search.
THE COURT:

I will find that he expressed some

facts that were not factually true.
MR. SKORDAS:

The deception is though we have

been watching you, we know you are dealing drugs and the
defendant goes, you got me.

I guess that's an exception,

but it is not the kind of thing that would be unexpected of
a narcotics dealer.

If they don't lie or say we have got a

warrant or, you know, he said, "We have been watching you.
We know you have got drugs."

He said, "Yeah, you are
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1

right."

2

I am concerned about the defendant's standing to say you

3

can't search the seat of this car.

4

Officers only see him driving it and with some suspicion

5

that this car is being used to go pick up some cocaine.

6

That's the reasonable suspicion that suspicion is exactly

7

confirmed.

He is in possession of the car and

obviously with the consent of the owner.

10
11

It is not even his car.

The only difference is —

THE COURT:

8
9

I don't see that that is necessarily a deception.

MR. SKORDAS:

That's not true —

the owner is

over there at McDonald's.

12

THE COURT: At least he is in possession of the

13

car with the consent of the person who has the right to

14

have —

15

the car is you know — what you want me to believe is

16

this—she said, "Take my car and go down and get this

17

stuff."

18

I assume the young lady who's registered owner of

MR. SKORDAS:

I can supply cases to the court if

19

you need to the effect that an onerable situation, even

20

Utah, the officer is allowed to search the area in the

21

immediate vicinity of the driver, passenger of the car.

22

That is for primarily the driver's safety.

23

will testify that coke was found under the seat.

24
25

THE COURT:

The officer

If the officer has a reasonable

articulable suspicion under the cases I am familiar with he
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has the right to do a search of the car, doesn't he?
MR. SKORDAS:

Right.

THE COURT:

With or without consent.

MS. WELLS:

That goes to the Terry issue and

whether the scope exceeds what he is intending to do.
Certainly, that goes to the house.

You can't forget that

the officer said that he believed that the so-called
consent was in part based upon the deception that the
officer had made to him, so if we should brief that issue,
Your Honor, when would you want us to do that?
THE COURT:

Ten days.

If you don't want to respond, you don't have to.
MR. SKORDAS:
weeks.

I will be gone two

This is Kent Morgan's case he asked me to try.
THE COURT:

return.

I want to.

Respond within five days after you

This man will sit in jail all the time?
MS. WELLS:

That's the problem.

THE COURT:

My inclination is it won't make any

difference.

He will be sitting in jail one way or another.

MS. WELLS:

I don't know, but I believe there's

also an immigration hold.

I should have that—we should

have those in in ten days; is that right?
THE COURT:

I think so.

Does that give you

enough time?
MR. SKORDAS:

We respond ten days after.
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